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WHAT’S WARREN BUFFETT’S SECRET TO GREAT WRITING?  
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham 
 
As directors increasingly ponder writing letters to shareholders, many turn to the gold standard. 
They wonder what most distinguishes Warren Buffett’s annual missive to Berkshire Hathaway 
shareholders. Clarity, wit and rationality are hallmarks to emulate, along with how Buffett 
personally pens lengthy sections to read more as literary essays than corporate communications.  
But these attractive qualities are products of a deeper distinction with greatest value. Every 
Buffett communiqué has a particular motivation: to attract shareholders and colleagues—including 
sellers of businesses—who endorse his unique philosophy.  Tenets include fundamental business 
analysis, old-fashioned valuation methods, and a long time horizon. 
A recurring motif of Buffett’s writing is the classic rhetorical practice of disagreement. 
Buffett recites conventional wisdom along with multiple reasons why it is inaccurate or 
incomplete. He then differentiates Berkshire with themes like autonomy, permanence, and trust.  
 Parsing recent examples will show that Buffett’s dispatches often work on several levels 
simultaneously. Think of circles on a dartboard, with the bull’s-eye as Berkshire’s distinctive 
practices, which Buffett relentlessly explains. Surrounding that core explication, in concentric 
circles, Buffett lauds specific Berkshire businesses or personnel, contrasts their industry or 
competitors, and opines on related public policy debates.  
By arguing in this artful manner, Buffett hones Berkshire’s corporate culture while 
answering rivals and critics alike. Leaving an unmistakable effect on the conglomerate’s millions 
of owners, managers, and employees, Buffett’s essays are a model of tone-at-the-top governance.    
Ethics and Clayton Homes 
Warren’s current letter includes a 1250-word essay featuring Berkshire’s Clayton Homes 
subsidiary. It makes and sells manufactured homes, as well as finances them through its Vanderbilt 
Mortgage unit. In 2003, when Berkshire acquired Clayton, Buffett excoriated its industry as 
“awash in problems” due to a bad business model, called securitization.  
Originators of home mortgages finance lending by selling loans to investment bankers who 
package them into debt-like securities offered to investors. Buffett criticized this as enabling “both 
the retailer and manufacturer to unload terrible loans on naïve lenders” while booking profits up-
front. 
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 In 2004, chiding that the “manufactured housing industry continues to reside in the 
intensive care unit of Corporate America,” Buffett announced a new business model: Clayton 
would retain all mortgages it originated or acquired from other dealers and Berkshire would fund 
them. He explained: “This pattern will be far different from that of the past, in which Clayton, like 
all major players in its industry, ‘securitized’ its receivables, causing earnings to be front-ended.” 
 After a few years of reports when Buffett referenced Clayton briefly—mostly to praise 
CEO Kevin Clayton as a “prototype Berkshire manager” for being “rational” and “a joy to work 
with”—the 2008 crisis prompted lengthy essays on it several years running. In each, Buffett 
championed the Berkshire-Clayton approach, chastised that of rivals, and prescribed policy 
responses.  
Specifically, in 2008, Buffett commended Clayton’s borrowers who “continued to pay 
normally throughout the housing crash, handing us no unexpected losses.” He boasted of the 
Berkshire-Clayton model’s simplicity and superiority:  
Why are our borrowers—characteristically people with modest incomes and 
far-from-great credit scores—performing so well? The answer is elementary, going 
right back to Lending 101. Our borrowers simply looked at how full-bore mortgage 
payments would compare with their actual—not hoped-for—income and then 
decided whether they could live with that commitment.  
In 2009, Buffett said the “industry is in shambles,” in part because of public policy that increases 
costs for its generally lower-income customers:  
The residential mortgage market is shaped by government rules that are 
expressed by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Their lending standards are all-
powerful because the mortgages they insure can typically be securitized and turned 
into what, in effect, is an obligation of the U.S. government. Currently buyers of 
conventional site-built homes who qualify for these guarantees can obtain a 30-year 
loan at about 5¼%. . . .   
In contrast, very few factory-built homes qualify for agency-insured 
mortgages. Therefore, a meritorious buyer of a factory-built home must pay about 
9% on his loan. . . . We have tried to qualify more of our customers’ loans for 
treatment similar to those available on the site-built product. So far we have had 
only token success. 
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Staying on message in 2010, Buffett reiterated old points in current context:  
Our borrowers get in trouble when they lose their jobs, have health 
problems, get divorced, etc. The recession has hit them hard. But they want to stay 
in their homes, and generally they borrowed sensible amounts in relation to their 
income. In addition, we were keeping the originated mortgages for our own 
account, which means we were not securitizing or otherwise reselling them. If we 
were stupid in our lending, we were going to pay the price. That concentrates the 
mind.  
Buffett said less in ensuing years, but returned with vigor to the topic this year. The 
inspiration? Tirades against Clayton begun April 2015 in the Seattle Times. Writers alleged that 
Clayton retailers steered customers into dubious mortgages of Clayton’s Vanderbilt unit, using 
fine-print deception and naming few or no alternative lending arrangements. 
Clayton disputed every assertion while acknowledging, as Warren had, that customers 
facing life challenges may have difficulty repaying loans.  The authors responded with a point-by-
point rebuttal.  At the May 2015 Berkshire shareholders’ meeting five weeks later, Buffett also 
repudiated the piece and, again, the writers published continued skepticism.  
Having written for a decade on the subject, Buffett used his March 2016 letter to update 
readers.  Buffett stressed that Clayton thrived amid industry turmoil because, rather than securitize, 
it was backed by Berkshire. Buffett used a known fact as a contrast: “The funds we supplied to 
Goldman Sachs and General Electric [in 2008] produced headlines; the funds Berkshire quietly 
delivered to Clayton both made home ownership possible for thousands of families and kept many 
non-Clayton dealers alive.” 
Without citing the attacks on Clayton’s disclosure, Buffett continued: “Our retail outlets, 
employing simple language and large type, consistently inform home buyers of alternative sources 
for financing.” Buffett adds: “The form we use is reproduced in its actual size on page 119 [of this 
report].” The form defies the allegations. 
While expanding upon previous denunciations of industry securitizations, Buffett 
highlighted unfinished public policy. He explained that the most important reform idea has not 
been enacted: to require mortgage originators to retain a substantial percentage rather than sell 
them all. In contrast, he emphasized: “At Clayton, our risk retention was, and is, 100%.”   
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Finally, Buffett makes a personal request: “Let me talk about one subject of which I am 
particularly proud, that having to do with regulation.” Noting increased financial industry 
oversight, Buffett reports governmental audits of Clayton’s business and its enviable record in line 
with Berkshire’s high standards of ethical conduct.  While rivals paid “billions of dollars in fines” 
in the previous two years, Clayton was fined a mere $38,200 and refunded only $704,678 to 
customers. For context, Clayton’s net income during that period was $1.2 billion.  Bull’s-eye. 
Productivity and 3G    
Berkshire culture contradicts that of private equity, which Warren has often panned for heavy 
meddling and lack of permanence. Yet in 2013 and 2014, Berkshire partnered with Jorge Paulo 
and his private equity firm, 3G, to acquire Heinz and then add Kraft—as 3G rapidly downsized 
both. Critics said Buffett had thus hypocritically abandoned his principles. 
  Buffett anticipated such commentary, in his 2013 missive giving a one-line account: 
“Though the Heinz acquisition has some similarities to a ‘private equity,’ transaction, there is a 
crucial difference: Berkshire never intends to sell a share of the company.” In 2014, he deflected 
criticism by conveying that downsizing decisions were not Berkshire’s but 3G’s: “I’m not 
embarrassed to admit that Heinz is run far better under [3G’s leadership] than would be the case if 
I were in charge.”  
  Such was too little for some critics, however, whose persistence inspired Buffett to expand 
on it this year.  Buffett’s opening bull’s-eye stated what Berkshire and 3G share: “We share with 
them a passion to buy, build and hold large businesses that satisfy basic needs and desires.” The 
point is then tempered: “We follow different paths, however, in pursuing this goal.” The 600-word 
essay then contrasts but strongly defends the 3G way: 
Their method, at which they have been extraordinarily successful, is to buy 
companies that offer an opportunity for eliminating many unnecessary costs and 
then—very promptly—to make the moves that will get the job done. Their actions 
significantly boost productivity, the all-important factor in America’s economic 
growth over the past 240 years. 
Buffett continues comparing and contrasting: 
At Berkshire, we, too, crave efficiency and detest bureaucracy. To achieve 
our goals, however, we follow an approach emphasizing avoidance of bloat, buying 
businesses . . . that have long been run by cost-conscious and efficient managers. 
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After the purchase, our role is simply to create an environment in which these 
CEOs—and their eventual successors, who typically are like-minded—can 
maximize both their managerial effectiveness and the pleasure they derive from 
their jobs. (With this hands-off style, I am heeding a well-known Mungerism: “If 
you want to guarantee yourself a lifetime of misery, be sure to marry someone with 
the intent of changing their behavior.”) 
After that lighthearted quip from Berkshire’s 92-year old vice chairman Charlie Munger, 
Buffett stands pat on Berkshire policy: “We will continue to operate with extreme—indeed, almost 
unheard of—decentralization at Berkshire. But we will also look for opportunities to partner with 
Jorge Paulo.” 
Changing the subject to another Berkshire virtue whose purity was not in doubt, Buffett 
reinforced his recurring message of Berkshire’s uniqueness: 
Berkshire, however, will join only with partners making friendly 
acquisitions.  To be sure, certain hostile offers are justified: Some CEOs forget that 
it is shareholders for whom they should be working, while other managers are 
woefully inept. In either case, directors may be blind to the problem or simply 
reluctant to make the change required. That’s when new faces are needed. We, 
though, will leave these “opportunities” for others. At Berkshire, we go only where 
we are welcome. 
While this short essay reaffirms Berkshire’s preference for friendly acquisitions, it left 
broader criticism of firms like 3G that so “very promptly” downsize businesses acquired for that 
purpose. So Buffett shifted circles, adding a separate 2,100-word essay about how “root[ing] out 
inefficiencies . . . has been the secret sauce of America’s remarkable gains in living standards since 
the nation’s founding in 1776.”    
Buffett offers a history lesson dramatizing the American experience. Here, Buffett shows 
he’s a virtuoso statistician as well as a talented writer by contrasting historical with contemporary 
data on productivity driving prosperity:  
* farm employment fell from 40% of the workforce—11 million people—in 1900 to 2% 
today, while production surged: in corn, for example, output rose from 30 to 150 bushels per acre 
* the railroad workforce dropped from 1.35 million after World War II to 187,000 now, as 
volume increased from 655 billion ton-miles of freight to 1.85 trillion 
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*in car insurance, the shift from agency distribution to companies selling their own policies 
slashed costs so much that today, at Berkshire’s GEICO subsidiary, half as many workers are 
needed per policy as in earlier generations 
* rising demand for renewables pressures electric utilities to increase efficiency—done 
well by Berkshire’s units, having multiplied megawatt-hours of output while reducing headcount 
 The essay is an inspired defense of 3G’s strategy of deflating bloated corporations. Detail 
from four industries is persuasive yet sits amid long-term trends having many causes without citing 
the productivity achievements of private equity.  
The type and sequence of examples is alluring: while such firms have not invented a better 
tractor or faster train, they may innovate with new distribution systems and drive operational 
efficiencies—as Berkshire insurance and energy subsidiaries have done.  
* * * * * 
Buffett’s essays are rich with history, putting current debates in broad context, and steeped 
in statistics, anchoring argument in data. Buffett contrasts and compares; jokes and quips; and 
prefers to praise by name but criticize by category. Even when confronting critics, Buffett’s essays 
avoid sounding defensive.  
Above all, the work expresses who Warren is—a confident, astute and joyous capitalist. 
Yale University writing professor William Zinsser says that “Motivation is at the heart of writing.” 
Buffett loves Berkshire, his curated life’s work defined by unusual shareholders, adroit managers, 
and idiosyncratic principles. Munger has commented: “Warren’s whole ego is poured into 
Berkshire.”   
More than the elements of style, such motivation is a gold standard worth aspiring to.  
 
* * * * * 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, a professor at George Washington University, has written a dozen 
books and hundreds of articles about business law and life, many addressing Berkshire Hathaway 
and Warren Buffett, including The Essays of Warren Buffett and Berkshire Beyond Buffett.  
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